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Although a large number of studies have been done on intergenerational transfers of goods,
little is known about intergenerational transfers of time. In step with an increase in the aging
of the population, the demand for time-intensive transfers in health care and other health
services increases. Using an overlapping generations model which incorporates uncertain
longevity, we set up a model which incorporates intergenerational transfers of time and ex-
amine the macroeconomic eﬀect of public long-term care policy (LTC). Using the model, we
show that LTC decreases the steady state level of capital, but that it enhances the welfare
level when the rate of tax is suﬃciently small.
Classiﬁcation Numbers: E60, I12, J14, J22
Key words: time transfers, household production, overlapping generations medel
1 Introduction
Over the past few decades, a considerable number of studies have been conducted on intergenera-
tional transfers. These studies show that altruism is important in determining dynamic resource
allocation.1 However, most of the research only considers transfers of goods; only a few pa-
pers consider transfers of time (see, for example, Cardia and Ng (2003) and Cardia and Michel
∗I would like to thank Taro Akiyama, Koichi Futagami, Ryo Horii, Tatsuro Iwaisako, Tsunao Okumura, Tetsuo
Ono, Kazuo Mino, Kazutoshi Miyazawa, Akira Momota, Mitsu-yoshi Yanagihara, seminar participants at Osaka
University and Yokohama National University, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions
on the paper. All remaining errors are naturally my own.
†Correspondence to: Department of Economics, European University Institute, Villa San Paolo, Via della
Piazzuola 43, 50133, Florence ITALY; E-mail:atsue.mizushima@eui.eu
1For example, fully altruistic behavior, agents’ utility ultimately depends on the utility of all of their descendants
and transfers resources on their descendants (e.g.Becker and Barro (1988) and Barro and Becker (1989)). From
a non-altruism perspective, transfers may arise of self-interest (e.g., Cox (1987)). Alternatively, the existence of
bequests may simply be an accident as in Abel (1985), and the existence of gifts may be the results of social norms
or customs that obligate children to provide some form of material support to their parents during old age, as
argued by Morand (1999).
1(2004)). The latter are particularly important here because of the prospect of ‘graying’ popu-
lations in many developed economies.2 Because physical and mental health tend to deteriorate
with age, the number of people who demand time-intensive transfers in health care and other
health services increases. For example, in the developed countries, the average density of practic-
ing nurses was increased from about 2.5 (1960) to about 8.1 per thousand people (2003)(OECD
(2005)). In Japan, about 94.8% of people who need health care are over 65 years of age.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the macroeconomic eﬀect of health care in an aging
economy. For this purpose, it extends a two-period overlapping generations model by introducing
uncertain longevity (Pecchenino and Pollard (1997)) and household health production (Grossman
(1972)). Using time, household health production determines the health status of old agents. We
introduce the family as the producer of health; and assume they maximize their joint utility
function. When young agents (adult-children) derive utility from the level of household health
status, they contribute household health production by supplying their endowed time with respect
to labor supply on market.
Previous research has examined the potential for uncertain longevity to explain the capital
accumulation or economic growth. Earlier studies rely on Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985),
who showed that an increase rate of life longevity increases capital stock. Pecchenino and Pol-
lard (1997) and Futagami and Nakajima (2001) also have the same results. However, de la Croix
and Licandro (1999), Fuster (1999), and Boucekkine, de la Croix, and Licandro (2002) conclude
that there exists an inverted U-shaped relationship between life longevity and economic growth.
Indeed, the results we present in this paper contradict these conclusions, and reveal that inter-
generational transfers of time provide another important mechanism on capital accumulation in
the model of uncertain longevity.
The increasing health care demand associated with an aging population has, nevertheless,
received much attention from other scholars. Norton (2000) focuses on the supply and demand
for nursing home care and on long-term care insurance. Lakdawalla and Philpson (2002) indicate
that the aging of the population represents not just a new source of long-term care demand, but
it may also represent a new source of long-term care supply. Unlike their long-term care model,
2According to Weil (1997), population aging can be seen in both a reduction in the fraction of the population
that is under 20, and an increase in the fraction over 64. In developed regions, the population aged 65 or over is
expected to nearly double, whereas the member of persons aged 0-24 is likely to decline. The person aged 65 or
over in the more developed countries represent 15.3 % (2005) and is estimated 26.1 % (2050) of all population; and
that of the person aged 0-24 represent 30.7 % (2005) and also is estimated to 25.8 % (2050) (See, United Nations
(2007)).
2in this paper, we focus our attention on the intra-family health care.3
Even in the presence in health care market and health insurance, the family is the main source
of health care. For example in Japan, 74.8% of total care is provided by the family and half of this
is provided by adult-children or daughters-in-law (The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare
of Japan (2004)). In Germany, 66% of older people rely on informal care, which is delivered by
families: spouses, daughters, and daughters-in-law. In Spain, nearly 70% of older people receive
exclusively family care. In Italy, 47.2% of families with a 65-year-old member receive care from
relatives. In the United Kingdom, the percentage of people aged 65 who receive only informal
care is 53%, and the percentage that receive both informal and formal care is 34% (See, for
details, Comas-Herrera, Raphael, and et al (2003, 2006)). According to NSFH (2005), 72.2% of
U.S. people agree with the question: “Children should take care of elderly parents”. Therefore,
it seems plausible to focus on the intra-family health care when we examine the macroeconomic
eﬀect of health care in an aging economy.
Our analysis builds primarily on previous research by Cardia and Michel (2004) and Tabata
(2005). Cardia and Michel (2004) study the intergenerational transfers of time by using household
production; and show the impact of intergenerational transfers of time on capital accumulation
and bequest behavior. In his theoretical paper, Tabata (2005) constructs a health care model
which incorporates uncertainty regarding life longevity and old-age health status. He shows the
consequences of goods-related health care for economic growth and welfare. We combine the
aspects of these authors, and then set up a theoretical model to examine the macroeconomic
eﬀect of time-related health care. Our methodology analysis, therefore, naturally allows the
alternative model to examine the macroeconomic eﬀect of health care.
From a policy standpoint, it is important to understand the macroeconomic impact of time-
related health care. If it reduces or increases the capital accumulation in an aging economy,
then changes in government long-term care inﬂuence individuals’ labor-care decisions and saving.
Therefore, in this paper, we also construct the model of public long-term care (LTC) where the
government transfers time to unhealthy old agents; then examine the macroeconomic eﬀect of
LTC.
3The ﬁrst generation of research on families’ care arrangements relies on Becker’s model of the family (see, for
example, Wolf and Soldo (1994) and Ettner (1996)). Most recent work has used game-theoretic bargaining models
to examine family care arrangements (see, for example, Pezzin and Schone (1997, 1999)). Unlike these studies, we
construct a general equilibrium overlapping generations model where young agents (adult-children) transfer their
time to old agents (aged-parents); and then examine the eﬀect of intergenerational transfers of time on capital
accumulation and welfare.
3The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3
analyzes the equilibrium in which there is no government. Section 4 examines the role and eﬀect
of LTC on the dynamic equilibrium. Section 5 shows the eﬀect of LTC on the steady-state level
of the welfare. Section 6 concludes this paper.
2 The Model
We consider a two-period overlapping generations model which incorporates uncertainty about
lifespan and illness status in old age. Time is discrete and the time horizon is inﬁnite. The
economy begins operating in period 1, and the cohort born in period t is known as generation
t. Generation t is composed of a continuum of Nt > 0 agents who live for a maximum of two
periods; that is, young and old. At each date, new generations, each consisting of a continuum
of agents with a unit measure, are born. They are endowed with one unit of time when young
and old. Those who are old in period 0 are the initial old.
Agents
We assume the probability that an agent lives through the period of old age is p ∈ (0,1). The
probability that an individual dies at the beginning of the period of old age, after having had a
child is 1 − p. Thus, in this model, p shows the life longevity. If an individual is alive in his or
her old age, he or she also has probability of being in unhealthy. The probability of an individual
being in healthy throughout his or her old age is ψ ∈ (0,1); the corresponding probability of
unhealthy is 1 − ψ. Therefore, there are three diﬀerent states in two periods of life: healthy,
unhealthy, and death.
A fraction pψ of young agents are of type g, whose parents are healthy. Type b agents, who
constitute p(1−ψ) of young agents, have parents who are unhealthy. The fraction 1−p of young
agents are of type d, whose parents die. In addition, the fraction pψ of old agents are of type g,
who are healthy. Type b agents, who constitute p(1−ψ) of old agents are unhealthy. The fraction
1 − p of old agents are of type d. We express the death-health status of each agent’s parents by
using the index i; each agent’s own status in his or her old age is indexed by j. To simplify the
analysis, we assume that the probability of death health status is not serially correlated across





pψ if s = g,
p(1 − ψ)i fs = b,
(1 − p)i f s = d.
(1)
4In the model, we introduce the family as the producer of health. In economic theories about
family, it is assumed that the family maximizes a joint ‘welfare function’ (Becker (1991)).4 By
using this assumption, the household-produced health function is given by the sum of individual
time: that is, adult-children’s and parents’ time:5
hj,t = djqi,t
t +γj,j = g,b, (2)
where dj ≥ 1 is a productivity parameter such that d>max{1,
γ
β} if j = g and d =1i fj = b.
The restriction of dj shows that when old agents are healthy, their productivity is higher than
unhealthy old agents, and it also ensures the interior solution of the care provision. In addition,
qi,t
t represents care provision from type i children to parents, and γj represents the productivity
of old agents. Each old agent supplies one unit of time to produce household health production,
although health productivity in old age is less than that of young age: γ<1i fj = g; and γ =0
if j = b, which is given exogenously. The productivity of old agents shows when altruism is
large, children supply a great deal of time to household health production, and that this altruism
enhances the productivity of old agents.
We assume that each agent of generation t ≥ 1, whose parents’ death health status is i has




≡ Eu(hi,t ,c i,t
t+1 ,h j,t+1 ;p,ψ)
= β lnhi,t + p(lnci,t
t+1 +ψ lnhg,t+1 +( 1− ψ)lnhb,t+1) i,j = g,b,d, (3)
where ci,t
t+1 is the consumption of market goods during old age, and β ∈ (0,1) measures the
degree of altruism towards parents. p and ψ are realized at the beginning of each period.
Since each agent is endowed with one unit of time, he or she allocates his or her time to
household health production qi,t
t and to market place producing market goods li,t
t. Each young
agent earns wage income wtli,t
t by working at the market place, and saves all the wage income for
his or her old age. When old, he of she receives the proceeds of his or her savings and allocates
his or her endowed time to household health production. Following Yaari (1965) and Blanchard
(1985), we assume the existence of actuarially fair insurance companies. These companies collect
funds and invest them in ﬁrms. Returns on investments are repaid to the insured household
members who are still living. In other words, the contract oﬀered by the insurance company
redistributes income from the dead to the living.
4The well-known work on the allocation of time in the family of Gronau (1973) also use this assumption.
5See Grossman (1972) and Jacobson (2000) for health production function.
5Suppose that the insurance company collects et from young agents (and thereby Et ≡ etNt in
the aggregate) in period t. (Note that old agents have no incentive to buy the annuity because
they are not alive in the subsequent period.) The company invests the funds for the ﬁrms and
acquires total proceeds of Rt+1Et in period t+1. Given that only pNt old agents who survive in
period t + 1 can receive Rt+1et/p from the insurance company (because of perfect competition
between companies). Thus, the rate of return on the annuities is Rt+1/p for the living and 0
for those who die at the end of period t. On the other hand, if young agents in period t invest
et directly in their ﬁrms, they receive Rt+1et whether they are alive or dead. (For agents who
do not live to the next period, their children inherit the funds.) Thus, the rate of return on
self-investment is Rt+1. Because we assume that agents have no bequest motive, they accept
the insurance contract, which yields a higher interest rate than does self-investment. Thus,
the budget constraints of generation t, and their parents’ death-health status i = g,b,d, are
ci,t
t+1 = Rt+1wtli,t
t /p. By combining the time constraints li,t
t +qi,t







t ),i = g,b,d. (4)
In each period, the time spent in the household on household health production or that spent in
the market place producing market goods must be nonnegative and must not exceed unity, as
follows:
0 ≤ qi,t
t ≤ 1, and 0 ≤ li,t
t ≤ 1,i = g,b,d. (5)
Taking Rt+1,w t,p, and ψ as given, each young agent maximizes the expected utility of (3) subject




⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
βd− γp
d(p + β)
if i = g,
β
p + β
if i = b,
0i f i = d.
(6)
Because an increase in life longevity p increases the opportunity cost of care provision, it decreases
the care provision of young agents. We derive aggregate care provision by summing up (6) by
using (1):













6See Appendix 1 for derivation.
6From the resource constraints, we obtain the aggregate labor supply as follows:















Young agents save all their wage income, aggregate savings are St ≡ stNt = wtltNt. Dividing
both sides by Nt, we have the following savings functions.












Firms are perfectly competitive proﬁt maximizers that produce output according to a Cobb–
Douglas production function of the form, Yt = AKα
t (ltNt)1−α, where Yt is aggregate output,
A>0 is a productivity parameter, and Kt is the aggregate capital stock. The production
function can be rewritten in intensive form as yt = A(kt)α(lt)1−α, where kt ≡ Kt/Nt is the per
capita level of capital. We assume that capital depreciates fully in the process of production.
Given that ﬁrms are price takers, they take the wage wt and the real rental price of capital Rt as
given; and then hire labor and capital so that their marginal products equal their factor prices:
wt =( 1− α)A˜ kα
t ,R t = αA˜ kα−1
t , (8)
where ˜ kt ≡ kt/lt is the capital–labor ratio.
3 Equilibrium
As a benchmark case, we ﬁrst examine the economy in which there is no government. In Section
4, we analyze an economy in which there is public policy. We ﬁrst derive the equilibrium in the
goods market. The equilibrium condition of the capital market is given by Kt+1 = stNt = wtltNt,
which implies that the savings of young agents in generation t forms the aggregate capital stock
in period t+1. Dividing both sides by Nt and using (8) yields the following equilibrium condition
of the capital market.
kt+1 =( 1− α)Akα
t l1−α
t (9)
In period 1, there are the young agents of generation 1 and the initial old agents of generation
0. The initial old agents of generation 0 are endowed with k1 units of capital. Each old agent
rents his or her capital to the insurance ﬁrms and earns an income of (R1/p)k1, which is then
consumed. The measure of initial old individuals is pN0 > 0. The utility obtained by each
individual in generation 0 is c0
1 + ψ lnhg,0
1 +( 1− ψ)lnhb,0
1.





t }i=g,b,d,k t,y t,w t,r t}∞
t=1, given the initial condition k1 = K1/N1 > 0, such that
all individual’s utility levels are maximized, ﬁrms’ proﬁts are maximized, and all markets are
cleared.
Using (7) and (9), we have the following low of motion of kt:












Since the law of motion (10) is concave function with respect to kt, letting kt+1 = kt = k∗ in



















β2 }, an increase in life longevity de-
creases steady state level of capital stock.
Proof. See, Appendix 2.
The intuition of Proposition 1 is as follows. In our model, an increase in life longevity has
two eﬀects on the capital accumulation. One is the ‘demographic eﬀect’, which operates through
aggregate labor supply for household health production. Because aggregate care provision for
household health production is formalized as Qt ≡ qtNt =
 
i=g,b,d θiqi,t
t Nt, care provision in-
creases with life longevity p. Therefore, an increase in life longevity lowers aggregate labor supply
and savings. Thus, the demographic eﬀect has a negative impact on the capital accumulation.
The other eﬀect is the ‘time preference eﬀect’. In our mode, the interest rate is an increasing
function of life longevity p; thus, an increase in life longevity can be interpreted as the rate
of time preference, as incorporated in models such as those of Yaari (1965), Blanchard (1985),
Pecchenino and Pollard (1997), and Futagami and Nakajima (2001). Therefore, an increase in
life longevity lowers each agent’s rate of time preference and increases savings. Thus, the time
preference eﬀect has a positive impact on the capital accumulation. An increase in the produc-
tivity d increases the marginal utility of household health production and results in a higher care
supply. Therefore, the demographic eﬀect dominates the time preference eﬀects to obtain the
result.
84 Public Long-term Care Policy
In the preceding sections, we described the economy where there is no government. In this section,
we introduce a government that provides public long-term care policy (LTC) to unhealthy old
agents.
We assume that LTC is implemented as follows. First, the government levies a payroll tax τ
on young agents (generation t). Second, the government employs each young agent (generation
t) zi,t
t and transfers time ˆ zt to unhealthy old agents (generation t − 1). When old agents supply
their one unit of time to the household health production, type g agents have a productivity level
of γ>1, whereas type b agents do not. Thus, LTC complements the productivity of type b old
agents by providing ˆ zt ≤ γ units of public care provision to those agents.
Because each young agent supplies zi,t
t time to the public care market in an economy with
LTC, aggregate public care provision Zt is determined as Zt ≡ ztNt =
 
i=g,b,d θizi,t
t Nt, and is
divided among unhealthy old agents. Thus, unhealthy old agents can receive an amount of public
care provision ˆ zt = zt/p(1 − ψ) through LTC.
The government collects payroll taxes from young agents who work in the market place and
in the public care market, and repays these revenues to young agents who work in the public
care market. For analytical simplicity, we assume that perfect substitution prevails between the
market place and the public care market, that is, the wage rates are equalized in both markets.
Thus we have the following budget constraint:
τ(lt + zt)wt = ztwt (12)
The left-hand side represents aggregate tax income collected by the government. The right-hand
side represents aggregate expenditure on the public care provision.
Given that the government transfers time to old agents (generation t − 1), the type b old
agents (generation t−1) can receive public care. Thus the household health production function
of type b agents is rewritten as follows:
hb,t = qb,t
t +ˆ zt. (13)
In addition, each young agent allocates his or her time to market place, family care, and











t ),i = g,b,d, (15)
0 ≤ qi,t
t ≤ 1, 0 ≤ li,t
t ≤ 1, 0 ≤ zi,t
t ≤ 1,i = g,b,d. (16)





(1 − τ)wt(1 − qi,t
t ),i = g,b,d. (17)
Taking Rt+1,w t,τ,ˆ zt,p, and ψ as given, each young agent whose parents’ death health status
is i = g (or i = b) maximizes (3) subject to (2) (or (13)), (16), and (17). Solving this problem





⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨






if i = g,
β − pˆ z
p + β
if i = b,
0i f i = d.
(18)
LTC compensates the care provision of type b agents whose parents are unhealthy, thus adult-
children decrease their care provision to household health production. Solving the program as
the same way with Section 2, we have the aggregate care supply as follows:











− p(1 − ψ)ˆ z
 
Nt. (19)
From (14) and (18), we obtain the following aggregate labor supply.7
Lt = ltNt =






4.1 Equilibrium with LTC
In this subsection, we derive the equilibrium of the economy with LTC. To ﬁnd the equilibrium,
we examine the equilibrium condition of goods market. The savings of young agents form the
aggregate capital stock in period t + 1, thus it is derived as Kt+1 = stNt =( 1− τ)wt(lt + zt)Nt.
Dividing both sides by Nt and substituting zt = τlt/(1 − τ) (see, (12)) into this equilibrium
condition, we have the following equilibrium condition:
kt+1 =( 1− α)Akα
t l1−α
t . (21)








t )+( 1− p)(1 −
zd,
t
t ))Nt. Noting that p(1 − ψ)ˆ zt = zt and ztNt =
τ
1−τ lt (see, (12)), we have the result.
10Using (8), (20), and (21), we have the following low of motion of kt:
kt+1 =( 1− α)Akα
t






Since the law of motion (22) is concave function with respect to kt, letting kt+1 = kt = k∗ in












Proposition 2 LTC lower the steady state level of capital stock.
LTC has two eﬀects on the capital accumulation. One is a “tax burden eﬀect”. Under the regime
of LTC, the government levies a payroll tax, which increases the opportunity cost of labor supply
and reduces labor supply and saving. Thus, it has a negative impact on the capital accumulation.
The other eﬀect is a “public care eﬀect”. LTC reduces the opportunity cost of care provision; it
decreases the care provision of type b agents and increases labor supply and saving. Although
LTC decreases the care provision of type b agents, only the public sector compensates the care
provision; thus the second eﬀect has no impact on saving. Therefore, LTC decreases the steady
state level of capital.
Proposition 3
(1) Suppose that τ>β , an increase in life expectancy increases the steady-state level of capital.
(2) Suppose that τ<βand that d>
ψγ(1−τ+2β)
β(β−τ) , an increase in life expectancy decreases the
steady-state level of capital.
Proof. See, Appendix 3.
Since per capita public care provision to unhealthy old agents increases with the tax rate, it
increases time preference eﬀect. Thus agents increase saving and steady-state level of capital.
In addition, an increase in altruism increases the care provision to household health production,
increases demographic eﬀect and decreases the steady-state level of capital.
5 Welfare Analysis
In this section, we examine the welfare impact of LTC. To do so, we compare the level of welfare
in the economy without LTC (in which τ = 0) and with LTC (in which τ>0). Because it is
complicated to analyze the allocation, we limit our attention to the steady-state in the rest of
11this section. We deﬁne the steady-state level of welfare as the sum of agents’ lifetime utilities,





= p2ψ lncg + p2(1 − ψ)lncb + p(1 − p)lncd + p(1 + β)(ψ lnhg +( 1− ψ)lnhb). (24)
where hg,h b, and ci(i = g,b,d) respectively represent the steady-state levels of health status and
consumption of each agent.
To facilitate comparison, we denote the steady-state levels of the welfare at the economy
without LTC as index n and the economy with LTC as index s.A sl n cn











d =l n {Rw
p },lnhg =l n {
β(d+γ)
p+β }, and lnhb =l n {
β
p+β}, substituting the steady-















+ pψ(1 + β)ln
 β(d + γ)
p + β
 
























p+β }, and lnhs
b =l n {
β(1+ˆ z)









} + p2(1 − ψ)ln{
p
p + β
(1 + ˆ z)}
+ pψ(1 + β)ln
 β(d + γ)
p + β
 
+ p(1 − ψ)(1 + β)ln
  β
p + β
(1 + ˆ z)
 
.
To determine the beneﬁt (or harm) of LTC, we subtract Ws from Wn, as follows:
Wn − Ws = p
 
− ln{1 − τ}−(1 − ψ)(1 + β + p)ln{1+ˆ z}
 
. (26)
It is complicate to investigate the eﬀect of life longevity on welfare level analytically, we provide
numerical examples. Since Wc −Ws is a linear function of p, and Wc −Ws takes 0 when p =0 ,
thus we examine the inside of braces in (26) to determine the value of Wc − Ws. Calculating
(26), we have the following proposition.
Proposition 4 If
ln(1−τ)




(1−ψ)(1+β−ψ)), then there exists a unique p∗ ∈ (0,1) such
that Wc >Ws ∀∈(0,p ∗] and Wc <Ws ∀∈[p∗,1).
Proof. See Appendix 4.









(1−ψ)(1+β+p) − ln{1+ˆ z}, ∂Γ(p;τ)/∂p =
ln(1−τ)
(1−ψ)(1+p+β)2
Deﬁne Γ(p;τ) ≡−ln{1 − τ}−(1 − ψ)(1 + β + p)ln{1+ˆ z}, ∂Γ(p;τ)/∂p =
12Lemma 1 For a given level of life expectancy, there exists a unique τ∗ ∈ (0,1) such that Wn >
Ws ∀τ ∈ (0,τ∗] and Wn <Ws ∀τ ∈ [τ∗,1).







(1−τ)2 > 0,limτ→0 −ln(1 − τ)=0 ,limτ→1 −ln(1 −
τ)=∞,( 1 −ψ)(1+p+β)
∂ ln(1+ˆ z)






d −β)+β] > 0,limτ→0(1−ψ)(1+





0. Therefore there exists a unique τ∗ ∈ (0,1) such that (1 − ψ)(1 + β + p)ln(1 + ˆ z) > −ln(1 −
τ)∀τ(0,τ∗] and (1−ψ)(1+β+p)ln(1+ˆ z) < −ln(1−τ)∀τ[τ∗,1). It follows Ws >Wn ∀τ ∈ (0,τ∗]
and Ws <Wn ∀τ ∈ [τ∗,1).
The welfare gain (or loss) that arises in an economy with LTC (in which τ>0) can be
interpreted as comprising a ‘health status eﬀect’, a ‘capital stock eﬀect’, and a ‘subsidy eﬀect’.
The health status eﬀect is represented by the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of (26). The
steady-state level of the health status improves when LTC is introduced, thus, a negative value
in (26) would be obtained. LTC also has a capital stock eﬀect on the welfare. Because LTC
implies a lower steady-state level of capital, it leads to lower steady-state levels of income and
welfare. This eﬀect is represented by the second term on the right-hand side of (26). In addition
to these two eﬀects, we have the subsidy eﬀect on the welfare. Because old agents can receive
public care provision without paying tax, this eﬀect enhances the steady-state level of the welfare
of old agents.
When the tax rate is low, the negative health status and subsidy eﬀects dominate the positive
capital stock eﬀect. However, when the tax rate is suﬃciently high, labor supply falls in the
economy with LTC. Consequently, LTC has a larger positive eﬀect on the capital stock. Thus,
the positive capital stock eﬀect outweighs the negative health status and subsidy eﬀects.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, our aim was to analyze the macroeconomic impact of intergenerational transfers
of time from adult-children to their aged-parents in an aging population. To examine these
issues, we extend a two-period overlapping generations model by introducing uncertain longevity
and household health production. We also assumed that (i) old agents use a household health
production with time as only input to improve their own health status; and (ii) young agents can
contribute to this production by transfers their time.
13Using this framework, in the ﬁrst part of this paper, we described an economy in which there
is no government. We showed that life longevity has a negative impact on the steady state level
of capital. To examine how the changes in government long-term care inﬂuence individuals’
saving decisions and welfare, in the second part of this paper, we introduced a government which
provides public long-term care policy (LTC). We showed that LTC lowers the steady state level
of capital, however, when the tax rate is small, LTC enhances the steady state level of welfare.
7 Appendix
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type d agent: If the parents of young agents die, agents derive any utility from household health
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d − β2 < 0 when d>
ψγ(1+2β
β2 . Therefore, when d>
ψγ(1+2β)
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d +β(τ −β). When τ>β , G(p) has two negative roots, thus G(p) > 0
for p ∈ (0,1). When τ<βand d>
ψγ(1−τ+2β
β(β−τ) , G(0) < 0 and G(1) < 0. Thus G(p) < 0 for all
p ∈ (0,1).
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